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Abstract—There is growing evidence that mutually beneficial
outcomes can be achieved when content distribution overlays and
their underlying ISPs collaborate through open interfaces.
However, most works in this area have focused on preference
costs derived from symmetric network properties (e.g. RTT).
The consideration of asymmetric preference costs is expected
to benefit from the development of consolidated topology con-
struction strategies that integrate the information provided by
all participating ISPs and use it to produce an overlay topology
with desirable global properties.
In this paper we propose a generic model for the multi-domain
consolidation of ISP preferences expressed as cost-annotated
lists of groups of topology-equivalent peers. Using this model,
we propose two consolidated topology construction strategies:
Shared Cost, designed to provide a tradeoff for preference cost
asymmetries, and Low Cost, designed to reduce the overall
preference cost that the overlay imposes on all its underlying
ISPs. We evaluate these two models through extensive simulations
over a wide range of ISP and PID size distributions, and we show
that preference consolidation can provide ISPs with outcomes
more aligned with their preferences than those provided by non-
consolidated operation.
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Fig. 1. Example: A possible source for asymmetric ISP preferences
Overlays collaborate with ISPs by driving their topology
formation processes using information that each node obtains
from its local ISP using open interfaces (i.e. [1]–[3]). This in-
teraction usually involves ranked or annotated lists of network
regions called PIDs, which constitute clusters of topologically
equivalent overlay nodes. By improving overlay construction
via biased node selection, these collaboration techniques can
be beneficial in reducing interdomain traffic and increasing
overlay performance [3]–[8]. In this paper, we will denote
Overlay-ISP collaboration interfaces as OIC interfaces.
Most studies to date have focused on using network locality
as the basis for these annotated PID lists. However, OICs
provide a good vehicle to implement other objectives such
as reducing interdomain traffic costs or managing persis-
tent traffic hotspots. These uses extend the study of Over-
lay/ISP collaboration into the realm of asymmetric preferences.
Whereas locality-based OIC costs are symmetric, e.g. have
the same properties in both directions, costs based on other
network metrics may not have this property. For instance,
ISPs contractually agree their interdomain costs with their
service providers, leading to cost asymmetries. An overlay
link between nodes in ISPs A and B may be cheap to A but
expensive to B, or vice-versa. Therefore, a traffic allocation
which is desirable to a given ISP may be undesirable for
another one, and achieving an appropriate tradeoff therefore
requires information from both ISPs. Taking interdomain cost
as an example, Fig. 1 shows three multi-homed stub ISPs with
arrows representative of the transit costs charged by their trans-
port providers. Conventional operation drives A to bias overlay
topology formation towards B, imposing upon it additional
costs. Likewise, C could load balance equally between A and
B, whereas biasing topology formation towards B and away
from A would reduce the total cost.
We propose to address this problem through consolidation
of preferences, a process whereby each OIC server provides
a preference-annotated list of PIDs, which are collected by
overlay peers and consolidated into a single preference-
annotated list that represents an adequate tradeoff between the
preferences of all ISPs involved. This list is then used by the
overlay to drive its topology construction.
The first contribution of our paper is the definition of a
generic model describing ISP preference consolidation, and is
presented in §II. A further contribution can be found in §III,
in which we present two preference consolidation strategies:
Shared Cost, designed to provide a tradeoff for preference
cost asymmetries, and Low Cost, designed to reduce the
overall preference cost that the overlay imposes on all its
underlying ISPs. We evaluate our consolidation strategies in
§IV, and show that preference consolidation can provide ISPs
with outcomes more aligned with their preferences than those
provided by non-consolidated operation. To achieve this, we
present quantitative measures for preference alignment, and
evaluate them through extensive simulations over a wide range
of ISP and PID size distributions. Finally, we present the
relevant related work in §V, and our conclusions in §VI.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
We consider an overlay with a presence in a set I of
NI ISPs, so that NI = |I|. We focus in the construction
of the service topology, that is, the set of overlay links that
nodes use to exchange large amounts of traffic (rather than
much smaller flows of signalling information). We call nodes
adjacent in the service topology as neighbours, and consider
the formation of this topology on the basis of ISP-provided
information. We will assume that once a node has selected
another node as a neighbour, this will trigger a unidirectional
traffic stream at a standard average rate. Node selection will
be our only consideration for topology construction; overlay-
specific algorithms related to incentives or content availability
(e.g. tit-for-tat) will not be considered.
We will assume that each overlay node will require k
neighbours, and that each ISP will provide an OIC server
that influences the topology formation choices of each node.
To this end, we assume that each ISP i decomposes the
entire set of overlay nodes into clusters of nodes which are
considered essentially indistinguishable from the point of view
of overlay topology formation; these will be called PIDs.
We will assume that each ISP i defines both a set PI(i)
of internal PIDs that correspond its own customers, and a
set of PIDs PE(i) that comprises all other overlay nodes.
Since these two are disjoint, each ISP can then define a set
P(i) = PI(i) ∪ PE(i) that represents all PIDs, both internal
and external (of course, PI(i) ⊂ P(i) and PE(i) ⊂ P(i)).
We define the creation of an overlay link between PID l and
PID m as the topology formation decision by a node in l
selecting a node in m as its neighbour in the overlay. Then,
we assume that each ISP i defines a preference cost function
ci(l,m) : PI(i) × P(i) → R+ that assigns preference costs
to overlay links. Note that we assume that an ISP i will only
define preference costs for overlay links initiating in PIDs local
to i (our model does not include transit ISPs, as in current
OIC interfaces these do not announce preferences). Hence,
ci(l,m) models how strongly does ISP i express a preference
for nodes from an internal PID l to select nodes in PID m
as neighbours in the overlay (m can be any PID, including
internal ones). This preference cost function forms the basis
for ISP-influenced overlay topology construction.
A. Preference Consolidation
In this paper we consider an multiple-ISP case in which
each ISP i generates an inter-PID cost function ci(l,m). To
simplify the problem, we will assume that there is a well-
known decomposition of overlay nodes into PIDs, and that all
PIDs are considered internal only for a single ISP. This means
that there is a universal P so that P(i) = P for all i, and that
internal PID sets PI(i) are disjoint subsets of P . Hence, in
ci(l,m), the ISP i is uniquely defined by the PID l, and we can
directly use the shorthand c(l,m) where l implicitly defines i
through a mapping i = pi(l) where pi(l) : P → I is a function
that maps each PID l to its provider ISP i. Formally, we define
the generic cost function c(l,m) : P×P → R+. This function
maps any given pair of overlay PIDs l and m to a positive value
representing the preference that ISP pi(l) has for nodes in PID
l to create overlay links with nodes in m. To simplify matters
further and aid comparison and aggregation, we assume that
all ISPs agree on a common set of cost semantics.
Let the space of all generic cost functions c(l,m) be called
C. A consolidation function is a function F : C → C that can
be used to generate a single preference cost function from the
partial preference cost functions provided by participant ISPs.
Formally, if we denote our consolidated preference cost func-
tion as κ(l,m), it follows that κ(l,m) = F (c(l,m)), where
F can be designed so that κ(l,m) has specific properties.
Since our objective is to compare these preference functions
quantitatively, we require a baseline that represents default
behaviour and from which we can measure any potential
improvements. For this, we will use a F equal to the trivial
identity mapping, so that κ(l,m) = c(l,m). We will call this
the default consolidation. Note that this corresponds to the
case in which every node queries their local OIC server and
ignores information provided by OIC servers of other nodes.
B. Overlay Topology Construction
We now address the modelling of how a particular consol-
idated cost function impacts the overlay topology formation
process. We assume that each node will query the overlay
for a set of candidate neighbours, and then select randomly
from this set (this is reminiscent of OIC interaction, with the
functions of the OIC server being provided by the overlay it-
self). The overlay can bias topology construction by providing
candidate nodes in given PIDs with non-uniform probabilities.
From a modelling standpoint, we simulate topology formation
by determining how many nodes (and from which PIDs) will
select nodes from a given PID as neighbours.
We start by defining a population function N(l) : P →
N that assigns to each PID l the number of overlay nodes
residing in it. In addition, we define a topology construction
function p(l,m) : P×P → [0, 1] that denotes the proportion of
nodes in PID l that select nodes in PID m as their neighbours.
Since p(l,m) can also be interpreted as the probability of a
node in l choosing a node in m as a neighbour, we have
that
∑
m∈P p(l,m) = 1. We will relate p(l,m) with κ(l,m)
through a preference-topology function G, so that p(l,m) =
G(κ(l,m)). Hence, G will model the impact that a given set
of consolidated preference costs κ(l,m) will have on p(l,m).
III. CONSOLIDATED TOPOLOGY CONSTRUCTION
In the following we propose and evaluate two consolidated
topology construction strategies: Shared Cost (SC) and Low
Cost (LC). Both these strategies consist of a consolidation
function F and a preference-topology function G. In addition,
to serve as a baseline for comparison, we also describe a third
algorithm that corresponds to a non-consolidated usage of the
generic preference costs c(l,m) provided by each OIC server.
A. Shared Cost (SC)
The objective of this consolidation strategy is to find a trade-
off for the cost asymmetries present in the generic preference
cost function c(l,m). To achieve this, we define F as function
that makes κ(l,m) symmetric by assigning it the average of
c(l,m) and c(m, l) weighed by the populations of m and l:
κ(l,m) = κ(m, l) =
N(l)c(l,m) +N(m)c(m, l)
N(l) +N(m)
. (1)
We define G by considering p(l,m) as inversely proportional
to κ(l,m), so that
p(l,m) =
κ(l,m)−1∑
n∈P κ(l, n)−1
. (2)
This means that, given a consolidated set of preference costs
κ(l,m), the overlay will select overlay links (l,m) with low
κ(l,m) with a higher frequency than those with high κ(l,m).
B. Low Cost (LC)
The objective of this consolidation strategy is to induce an
overlay topology that reduces the overall preference cost that
the overlay imposes on all its underlying ISPs. To achieve this,
the overlay will only create overlay links between PIDs l and
m if κ(l,m) is among the q lowest preference cost alternatives
for PID l. More formally, we only allow nodes in a given PID
l to become neighbours of nodes belonging to PIDs in a subset
Ql of cardinality q. We define Ql to include the first q PIDs
in a list of P sorted by the preference cost c(l,m). Hence, the
PIDs in Ql will be the q PIDs that have the lowest cost from
l, and we have that
κ(l,m) =
{
1 if l ∈ Ql
∞ otherwise. (3)
We define G in the same way as for the SC case, so that (2)
still holds. For the specific case of LC, then, we have that
p(l,m) =
{ 1
q if l ∈ Ql
0 otherwise.
(4)
C. Default
The objective of this consolidation strategy is to model the
default situation where each node queries its local OIC server
and performs node selection on the basis of this information
only. For this strategy, we define F as the identity function so
that κ(l,m) = c(l,m), and use G so that (2) holds. Hence,
p(l,m) is inversely proportional to c(l,m).
IV. EVALUATION
We will focus our evaluation on the degree to which the
overlay behaviour induced by a given consolidation strategy
aligns with the preferences of ISPs as expressed by their costs
c(l,m). We will start by defining a set of measures that will
allow us to assess the performance of our proposed preference
consolidation strategies.
A. Evaluation Measures
The first measure that we define is the full Inter-PID pref-
erence cost f(l,m), that models the preference cost imposed
upon PID l by all overlay links between l and m. Formally,
f(l,m) = k ( N(l)p(l,m) +N(m)p(m, l) ) c(l,m), (5)
where l ∈ P denotes a local PID that has a number of overlay
links with PID m ∈ P , N(l) the population of l, k the number
of neighbours of each overlay node, and p(l,m) the probability
of a node in l choosing a neighbour in m. (see §II).
To model the preference cost that PID l incurs from overlay
links both originating and terminating on its internal nodes,
we simply aggregate f(l,m) over m. This allows us to define
the ISP Cost φ(i), that models the preference cost that ISP i
incurs from overlay links both originating and terminating on
its internal PIDs. Formally, we have that
φ(i) =
∑
l∈PI(i)
∑
n∈P
f(l, n). (6)
The expressions that we have just defined for f(l,m) and
φ(i) will allow us to estimate the overall preference cost
that our proposed consolidation strategies have on the ISPs
providing connectivity services to the overlay. We now provide
a measure that directly assess the degree to which the outcome
of a consolidation algorithm matches the preferences of each
given ISP as expressed in their advertised OIC costs. To
achieve this, we define the preference concordance δ(l), a
measure for the cosine similarity between the full Inter-PID
cost f(l,m) and the generic preference cost c(l,m) for a given
PID l. We define δ(l) as
δ(l) =
∑
n∈P f(l, n)c(l, n)√∑
n∈P f(l, n)2
√∑
n∈P c(l, n)2
. (7)
Conceptually, δ(l) measures the cosine of the angle subtended
between f(l,m) and c(l,m) if l is fixed and both are treated
as vectors. Hence, if for PID l the full Inter-PID costs f(l,m)
induced by the topology construction function p(l,m) have
a similar structure as the ISP preference costs c(l,m), we
have that δ(l) ≈ 1 and the concordance is high. Conversely,
if the structures of f(l,m) and c(l,m) are dissimilar, the
costs induced by p(l,m) are very different from the c(l,m)
expressed by the ISP, δ(l) 1 and the concordance is low.
B. Evaluation Environment
We use a simulation-based approach to evaluate a series
of scenarios. In order to directly compare the results between
simulation runs, the number of ISPs, PIDs and nodes was
kept constant for all runs. In particular, all our simulation runs
consider an overlay with Np = 106 nodes, NP = 103 PIDs,
NI = 10
2 ISPs, and k = 10 outgoing overlay links per node.
However, within these constraints, we did vary the internal
structure of the overlay by varying both the number of PIDs
per ISP and the number of nodes per PID. In both cases, due
to its simplicity and flexibility we used a Zipf distribution to
assign sizes to ISPs and PIDs by their rank. This means that
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Fig. 2. Topology Construction Scenarios
the j-th biggest PID will have N(j) = Npz(j; s,NP ) nodes,
where z(j; s,N) is the Zipf density
z(j; s,N) =
j−s∑N
n=1 n
−s . (8)
Similarly, the j-th biggest ISP will have NP z(j; s,NI) PIDs.
By changing the characteristic exponent s it is possible to
explore different degrees of variability in the sizes of ISPs
and PIDs. If s is small, z(j; s,N) will be very similar
for all ranks, and we have a situation where all ISPs have
approximately the same number of PIDs, and where most PIDs
have approximately the same number of nodes. Conversely, for
larger s, z(j; s,N) will decrease quickly with rank, leading
to ISPs with widely varying numbers of PIDs and PIDs with
widely varying numbers of nodes. We do not claim that this
is a realistic model for a specific class of overlays. Rather, we
focus our work on the analysis of the inherent properties of
consolidation strategies, and use (8) as a controlled mechanism
to generate a diverse set of overlay topologies for simulation.
In this paper we present results for a number of values
of s in the interval [.1, 1.5]. Results for the values s =
{.1, .5, 1, 1.5} are shown in Fig. 2. The overlay structures
induced by these values go from an almost homogeneous
scenario in which there are approximately 10 PIDs per ISP,
103 nodes per PID, and 104 nodes per ISP (when s = .1)
to a very heterogeneous scenario where these values range
over 2 to 4 orders of magnitude across all ISPs and PIDs
(for s = 1.5). Hence, the results presented are representative
of a very wide variation on the ISP and PID structure of a
large application-layer overlay. For the Low Cost consolidated
topology construction strategy, we used q = 110NP .
With regards to the preference costs c(l,m), we stress that
they are not meant to be representative of actual interdomain
billing costs. Instead, they are meant to convey the relative
preferences of ISPs regarding which egress links to use.
Since ISPs could potentially advertise their preference costs
over widely different ranges, we assume that the overlay
normalises them before processing so that
∑
n∈P c(l, n) = Sc;
this facilitates preference cost comparisons between PIDs
and eliminates the problem of some PIDs reporting arbi-
trarily high costs. Given the lack of asymmetric preference
cost datasets, we decided to generate c(l,m) artificially by
uniformly drawing values from the interval [0, Sc] subject
to the normalisation restriction; the resulting CDF is shown
in Fig. 2. In order for preference cost comparisons to be
valid, the consolidated values κ(l,m) were also normalised so
that
∑
n∈P κ(l, n) = Sc. For this paper, we used Sc = 10
3.
In order to quantify overlay-wide performance, we define
two measures: the total normalised overlay cost Φ and the to-
tal normalised preference concordance ∆. These are designed
to be overlay-wide versions of (6) and (7), and are defined as
Φ =
NP
NpkSc
∑
i∈I
φ(i), ∆ =
1
NP
∑
l∈P
δ(l).
Intuitively, Φ represents the overlay-wide average preference
cost per overlay link once it has been normalised by ScNP , the
average c(l,m) associated with any PID l; ∆ represents the
average preference concordance over all PIDs in all ISPs.
C. Discussion of Results
The result of four sample simulation runs for s =
{.1, .5, 1, 1.5} are shown in Fig. 3. Each one of the curves in
each graph correspond to one of the three consolidated topol-
ogy construction strategies presented. In Fig. 3a, we see that
for very homogeneous overlay structures (s = .1), the Default
consolidation strategy produces consistently higher preference
costs φ(i) for many ISPs when compared with both SC and
LC, with LC producing the lowest preference cost. However,
as shown in Fig. 3b, LC also produces overlays with very low
concordance values δ(l), which may be unattractive for ISPs as
they greatly deviate from their preferences c(l,m). For these
homogeneous overlays, SC not only achieves slightly lower
preference cost, but also a greatly improved concordance of
approximately .8. The Default consolidation strategy achieves
a maximum concordance of around 0.4, and has a significant
spread, indicating that the degree of alignment between c(l,m)
and f(l,m) varies greatly between PIDs.
As overlay heterogeneity increases to s=.5 in Fig. 3c and
s=1 in Fig.3e, we see that the preference cost benefits pro-
vided by LC are reduced, since its φ(i) CDF extends further to
the right. In addition, the CDFs for SC and Default increase
their variability, including more ISPs with both smaller and
larger φ(i). As a result of the increasing number of smaller
ISPs, this manifests itself as a shifting of the CDFs towards the
left. However, since a small number of much bigger ISPs are
added as well, the expectation of the cost distributions exhibit
limited change. Regarding the concordance δ(l), the CDF of
SC is quickly shifted to the left first with s = .5 (Fig. 3d)
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Fig. 3. Simulation results for s = {.1, .5, 1, 1.5}
and further still with s=1 (Fig. 3f), implying that as overlay
heterogeneity increases the preference alignment of SC with
c(l,m) is quickly reduced for many PIDs. The concordance
curve for Default is also shifted to the left, but at a much
slower rate. The LC concordance experiences little change.
For the most heterogeneous case studied (s = 1.5), Fig. 3g
shows little evidence for a change in the CDF of φ(i) for LC,
SC or Default. However, the CDF of δ(l) continues shifting
to the right, with SC and Default becoming indistinguishable.
In order to track changes in Φ and ∆ more accurately, we
performed ∼36000 simulation runs for a sequence of values of
s ∈ [.1, 1.5]. The results of these simulations are presented in
Fig. 4. Each data point in Figs. 4a and 4b represents ∼3000
simulation runs, with the error bars marking the 10-th and
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Fig. 4. Overlay-wide simulation results for .1 ≤ s ≤ 1.5
90-th percentiles of the Φ and ∆ distributions respectively.
The general conclusions derived from the φ(i) and δ(l)
CDFs in Fig. 3 are confirmed by this analysis. First, we note
that as s increases, Φ for the Default and LC consolidation
policies remains essentially unchanged in the mean, but ex-
hibits increased variability. For SC, both Φ and the variability
of the distribution increase slowly with s, with these increases
becoming much more visible for [1 ≤ s ≤ 1.5].
Finally, regarding ∆ we see that for small values of s the SC
policy has vastly higher concordances than those of either LC
or Default. However, the expected ∆ of SC drops very quickly
as s increases, approaching that of Default for s ≥ 1.2. This
drop in concordance can also be seen for Default and LC, but
these two cases it is much less pronounced.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from these results
is that, for all values of s considered (i.e. ISP and PID
size distributions), SC provides higher concordance ∆ at a
lower preference cost Φ when compared with Default. As
shown in Fig. 3, these properties are also present in terms
of the CDFs of both φ(i) and δ(l), with the δ(l) CDF of SC
generally to the right of that of Default, and with the φ(i)
CDF of Default generally to the right of that of SC. Hence,
both when considering preference cost or concordance, SC is
more compatible with the preferences of ISPs than Default.
However, as shown in Fig. 4b this is critically dependent on
the structural properties of the overlay, with SC performing
much better for overlays with more homogeneous ISP and
PID structures. A more detailed analysis of this issue, based on
both overlay measurements and appropriate modelling based
on the the Internet AS topology, is left for future work.
V. RELATED WORK
The expression of explicit interactions between overlays
and ISPs is receiving increased attention by the research
community (see, for instance, [4], [9], [10] ). One of the first
works to focus in BitTorrent locality was [5], which relies
on the ISP tagging each node as either local or external.
This allows the overlay to set a soft limit on external nodes,
biasing node selection and giving preference to intradomain
connections. In [11], the authors present a system in which
an oracle performs node ranking according to the preferences
of the ISP. Although many possible metrics are presented
as candidates (IGP metric distance, geographical information,
expected delay, etc.) the authors focus in AS path length. In
[4], this system is extended to take into account node upload
bandwidth, and further improved upon by allowing the oracle
to enrich DNS responses with ISP-provided information [12].
Another contribution in this topic is P4P [2], which became the
basis for one of the main standardisation efforts in the area [1].
In its original presentation, [2] relied on the ISP aggregating
nodes into groups called PIDs and then providing a set of end-
to-end costs between the PIDs. These ISP-provided prices are
used by the overlay to calculate its traffic matrix.
Regarding the reduction of ISP costs, multiple solutions
have been proposed. Examples include ISP peering , IP
multicast, content distribution networks and P2P localisation
[6], [13], [14]. Another technique that has received increased
attention from the research community is traffic shaping,
that relies on reducing peak traffic volumes. This, in turn,
reduces costs because traffic is usually billed on the basis
of its 95-th percentile [15]. Particular approaches to reduce
interdomain costs include simple rate-limiting/traffic shaping
[16] or deferred transmission of delay-tolerant traffic [17].
Another proposal [18] proposes multiple ISPs to cooperate by
jointly purchasing bulk transit bandwidth. This can be used to
save costs due to the economies-of-scale effect of subadditive
pricing as well as burstable billing: not all ISPs transit their
peak traffic during the same period.
Finally, there has been some interest to approach the
overlay-ISP interaction problem from the perspective of eco-
nomics. As an example of this current of work, [19] presents a
market-centric, architectural view. Additional examples of the
analysis of cooperative outcomes between ISPs and overlays
include the use of the Shapley value [20].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a generic model for the con-
solidation of asymmetric ISP preferences expressed as cost-
annotated lists of PIDs (e.g. topologically equivalent clus-
ters of overlay nodes). Using this model, we proposed two
consolidated topology construction strategies: Shared Cost,
designed to provide a tradeoff for preference cost asymmetries,
and Low Cost, designed to reduce the overall preference
cost that the overlay imposes on all its underlying ISPs. We
evaluate these two models through simulation, considering a
wide range of ISP and PID size distributions. Our baseline
for comparison was Default, a consolidation-free strategy in
which each node biases its own topology formation algorithms
using cost information that obtained only from its local ISP.
We then compared our consolidated topology construction
strategies using two main tools: the ISP Cost φ(i), a measure
for the preference cost that an ISP i incurs from overlay links
both originating and terminating on its internal PIDs, and the
preference concordance δ(l), a measure for the cosine similar-
ity between the preference costs that an ISP experiences and its
own preference costs as advertised through the OIC interface.
Using these measures, we show that for asymmetric preference
costs, consolidation strategies can provide ISPs with outcomes
that are more aligned with their own preferences than those
provided by non-consolidated Overlay/ISP collaboration.
This research has received funding from the Seventh Frame-
work Programme (FP7/2007-2013) of the European Union,
through the ENVISION project (grant agreement 248565).
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